In he published Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik translated as Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics , the so called Kantbuch, which explicitly sets out the conditions according to which the futural dimension of time makes the kind of interpretation possible that would move things forward. In Sein und Zeit Heidegger had argued that the historicity of human existence, or Dasein, implies a legacy that we inherit.
Historicity is not the same as history. Historicity is the condition of being historical. And as Sein und Zeit teaches, the aim of locating and understanding conditions cannot necessarily be achieved by simply studying the phenomena i.
In other words Heidegger is interested in the connection that Aristotle had suggested between what is necessary and what is possible but not always necessary. In a strange reversal the necessary turns out to be possibility, i.
The consequence for Heidegger is that the best way forward, in any of the dimensions that humans operate in, implies types of response to the traditions, legacies and histories that make us what we are. The notion of repetition, Wiederholung, which was introduced in the lecture Der Begriff der Zeit, and provisionally analyzed in Sein und Zeit, is yet more fully worked out in the Kantbuch.
In this way it first comes to be preserved in its capacity as a problem. To preserve a problem, however, means to free and keep watch over those inner forces which make it possible, on the basis of its essence, as a problem. What is affirmed is the problematic. The strategy thus involves the location of a persistent problem for instance, the problem of time or of being , the working out of its conditions and the repetition of those conditions in a response that perpetuates the problematic i.
A basic grounding or founding problem of metaphysics can always be interpreted as a possibility of its future. In this way the legacy or tradition can be read in terms of its Geschick—not its destiny but its open possibilities of destination; not as fate in any of the traditional senses but as sending forth in a sense closer to that of telecommunication. The lecture can be read as a challenge to philosophize. It takes up issues familiar from Sein und Zeit, particularly the analysis of anxiety and nothingness, but presents them in a new and provocative way.
The nothing helps to disclose being in its previously concealed strangeness, showing how the transcendence of Dasein is held out over the nothing from the strictly finite and limited vantage of being, which can now be revealed in contrast as temporarily meaningful, but bounded by meaninglessness. Nevertheless, during the early s, he became sympathetic to Nazism. In a move that is actually entirely in line with his long term philosophical preoccupations, he condemns contemporary versions of academic freedom as arbitrary and lacking constraint.
He sees the occasion as an opportunity to establish a firm ground at last for knowledge, which would spell the end for the looseness of the various ungrounded empirical sciences and the domination of relativity amongst the disciplines. Despite his clear alignment with the party, however, his sense of what this would mean has less to do with concrete Nazi politics—there is no discussion of racial superiority or of global domination—but more with his own philosophy, such that the confrontation with being would act as a ground and unifying force for the German University in its role in the destiny of the German Volk and in what he calls its spiritual mission.
Students will henceforth fulfill their mission in three ways: in labor, in the military and in knowledge. During some of the Jewish people most closely associated with Heidegger were forced to leave the country. His ex lover Hannah Arendt and his lifelong correspondent Elisabeth Blochmann would both renew relations with Heidegger after the war but for the moment their contacts were broken off.
Relations between the two had anyway become strained when Husserl had digested the extent to which Sien und Zeit departed from his own project of phenomenological science. But their break during this time contributed to the unfounded rumor that Heidegger had banned his friend and ex-teacher from the university.
While Heidegger did little or nothing to discourage the official dissociation of Jewish colleagues and students from the university during his time as rector, there remains scant evidence of any overt anti-Semitism. Conflicts with party officials as well as with students and faculty led him to resign as rector on 21 April , after which he played no further part in political affairs, though his thought would continue to engage on an increasingly more developed political level.
Heidegger did not publish very much during the remainder of the war, though he continued to lecture. The key distinction in the article is between world and earth and the article works through three rather different kinds of artworks. Rather, art discloses the nature of things. Equipment, unlike art, disguises its status as a thing. Its material nature is absorbed in its function. The artwork, however, draws attention to the materials from which it was formed.
The artwork thus draws attention to the struggle between form and matter. But what is the earth? Heidegger shifts his attention to a Greek Temple, partly to underline the fact that his reading of artworks is not based on a model of representation.
Rather the role of the shoes as equipment is revealed in an artwork that takes as its topic the medium between the world of the peasant and the earth on which the peasant treads. The temple shows how a work of art not only opens up a world but also unifies and structures the world of a historical people. In doing so it contextualizes the earth upon which it stands, instituting a particular interpretation of the relationship between the cultural contrivances of Dasein and the natural world with which those contrivances are engaged.
Finally, Heidegger turns to what he calls Dichtung, which in its fully etymological sense means invention. The ordinary and the everyday is made strange in art, revealing the struggle between the newness of art and the state of things out of which it had to have emerged.
The meaning of Dichtung in the normal sense is, of course, poetry. Because the matter or earth of poetry is language and because language is what gives Dasein names for beings, then poetry has the power of addressing the possibility of human communications and relations.
The relationship between world and earth, when it takes the form of linguistic innovation, reveals the torturous ways in which the relations between concepts and words are formed and form each other. Poetry can thus be grasped as the most essential kind of artwork because it performs an absolutely singular intervention that is also a form of disclosing. Poetry reveals the conditions on which not only artworks but all other kinds of communicating and all other kinds of thing are possible at all.
For this reason Heidegger increasingly privileges Dichtung in his works of this period and later. The disclosing of being—if it is to be achieved in any way that eludes the classifying, calculating procedures of modernity—must be an evidently singular event each time.
When Heidegger uses the term himself he tends to refer to a stage or procedure that allows the passage from Division Two to Division Three which did not appear of Sein und Zeit. What this implies is that inauthentic everyday distraction by the present should be overcome in the authentic disclosure of being as historical destiny.
The task is to learn how to listen to the poet. The argument suggests that Heidegger was locked in a struggle both with himself and with the politics of the German nation. The critical, arguably moral, attitude towards the everyday—which is not evident in Sein und Zeit—relates explicitly to the everyday life of the Nazi regime, which Heidegger found himself in the midst of: the political subordination of thought, art, history and writing to the urgency of everyday political interests; the busy cultural activities; the explicit biologism of racist dogma; and the ubiquity of bureaucratic procedures and hierarchies.
Out of this dynamic interplay, Dasein emerges as a delicate balance of determination thrownness and freedom projection. The projective possibilities available to Dasein are delineated by totalities of involvements, structures that, as we have seen, embody the culturally conditioned ways in which Dasein may inhabit the world. Understanding is the process by which Dasein projects itself onto such possibilities.
Crucially, understanding as projection is not conceived, by Heidegger, as involving, in any fundamental way, conscious or deliberate forward-planning. The primary realization of understanding is as skilled activity in the domain of the ready-to-hand, but it can be manifested as interpretation, when Dasein explicitly takes something as something e.
NB: assertion of the sort indicated here is of course just one linguistic practice among many; it does not in any way exhaust the phenomenon of language or its ontological contribution.
Another way of putting the point that culturally conditioned totalities of involvements define the space of Dasein's projection onto possibilities is to say that such totalities constitute the fore-structures of Dasein's practices of understanding and interpretation, practices that, as we have just seen, are projectively oriented manifestations of the taking-as activity that forms the existential core of Dasein's Being.
Thrownness and projection provide two of the three dimensions of care. The third is fallen-ness. Such fallen-ness into the world is manifested in idle talk roughly, conversing in a critically unexamined and unexamining way about facts and information while failing to use language to reveal their relevance , curiosity a search for novelty and endless stimulation rather than belonging or dwelling , and ambiguity a loss of any sensitivity to the distinction between genuine understanding and superficial chatter.
Each of these aspects of fallen-ness involves a closing off or covering up of the world more precisely, of any real understanding of the world through a fascination with it. Here, in dramatic language, is how he makes the point. In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services such as the newspaper, every Other is like the next.
Being and Time This analysis opens up a path to Heidegger's distinction between the authentic self and its inauthentic counterpart. Moreover, as a mode of the self, fallen-ness is not an accidental feature of Dasein, but rather part of Dasein's existential constitution. It is a dimension of care, which is the Being of Dasein. So, in the specific sense that fallen-ness the they-self is an essential part of our Being, we are ultimately each to blame for our own inauthenticity Sheehan So authenticity is not about being isolated from others, but rather about finding a different way of relating to others such that one is not lost to the they-self.
It is in Division 2 of Being and Time that authenticity, so understood, becomes a central theme. He argues that we should i pay proper heed to the thought that to understand Dasein we need to understand Dasein's existence as a whole, and ii shift the main focus of our attention from the inauthentic self the they-self to the authentic self the mine-self Being and Time Both of these transitions figure in Heidegger's discussion of death.
So far, Dasein's existence has been understood as thrown projection plus falling. The projective aspect of this phenomenon means that, at each moment of its life, Dasein is Being-ahead-of-itself, oriented towards the realm of its possibilities, and is thus incomplete. Death completes Dasein's existence. Therefore, an understanding of Dasein's relation to death would make an essential contribution to our understanding of Dasein as a whole.
But now a problem immediately presents itself: since one cannot experience one's own death, it seems that the kind of phenomenological analysis that has hitherto driven the argument of Being and Time breaks down, right at the crucial moment.
One possible response to this worry, canvassed explicitly by Heidegger, is to suggest that Dasein understands death through experiencing the death of others. However, the sense in which we experience the death of others falls short of what is needed. We mourn departed others and miss their presence in the world. But that is to experience Being-with them as dead, which is a mode of our continued existence.
As Heidegger explains: The greater the phenomenal appropriateness with which we take the no-longer-Dasein of the deceased, the more plainly is it shown that in such Being-with the dead, the authentic Being-come-to-an-end of the deceased is precisely the sort of thing which we do not experience. Death does indeed reveal itself as a loss, but a loss such as is experienced by those who remain. Being and Time What we don't have, then, is phenomenological access to the loss of Being that the dead person has suffered.
But that, it seems, is precisely what we would need in order to carry through the favoured analysis. So another response is called for. Heidegger's move is to suggest that although Dasein cannot experience its own death as actual, it can relate towards its own death as a possibility that is always before it—always before it in the sense that Dasein's own death is inevitable.
Peculiarly among Dasein's possibilities, the possibility of Dasein's own death must remain only a possibility, since once it becomes actual, Dasein is no longer. And it is this awareness of death as an omnipresent possibility that cannot become actual that stops the phenomenological analysis from breaking down. The detail here is crucial. My death is mine in a radical sense; it is the moment at which all my relations to others disappear. When I take on board the possibility of my own not-Being, my own being-able-to-Be is brought into proper view.
Hence my awareness of my own death as an omnipresent possibility discloses the authentic self a self that is mine. Moreover, the very same awareness engages the first of the aforementioned transitions too: there is a sense in which the possibility of my not existing encompasses the whole of my existence Hinman , , and my awareness of that possibility illuminates me, qua Dasein, in my totality.
Indeed, my own death is revealed to me as inevitable, meaning that Dasein is essentially finite. Care is now interpreted in terms of Being-towards-death, meaning that Dasein has an internal relation to the nothing i. As one might expect, Heidegger argues that Being-towards-death not only has the three-dimensional character of care, but is realized in authentic and inauthentic modes.
Let's begin with the authentic mode. We can think of the aforementioned individualizing effect of Dasein's awareness of the possibility of its own not-Being an awareness that illuminates its own being-able-to-Be as an event in which Dasein projects onto a possible way to be, in the technical sense of such possibilities introduced earlier in Being and Time.
It is thus an event in which Dasein projects onto a for-the-sake-of-which, a possible way to be. More particularly, given the authentic character of the phenomenon, it is an event in which Dasein projects onto a for-the-sake-of-itself.
Heidegger now coins the term anticipation to express the form of projection in which one looks forward to a possible way to be. Given the analysis of death as a possibility, the authentic form of projection in the case of death is anticipation. Indeed Heidegger often uses the term anticipation in a narrow way, simply to mean being aware of death as a possibility.
But death is disclosed authentically not only in projection the first dimension of care but also in thrownness the second dimension. The key phenomenon here is the mode of disposedness that Heidegger calls anxiety. Anxiety, at least in the form in which Heidegger is interested, is not directed towards some specific object, but rather opens up the world to me in a certain distinctive way.
When I am anxious I am no longer at home in the world. I fail to find the world intelligible. Thus there is an ontological sense one to do with intelligibility in which I am not in the world, and the possibility of a world without me the possibility of my not-Being-in-the-world is revealed to me. Heidegger has now reinterpreted two of the three dimensions of care, in the light of Dasein's essential finitude.
But now what about the third dimension, identified previously as fallen-ness? Since we are presently considering a mode of authentic, i. This is an issue that will be addressed in the next section. First, though, the inauthentic form of Being-towards-death needs to be brought into view.
In everyday Being-towards-death, the self that figures in the for-the-sake-of-itself structure is not the authentic mine-self, but rather the inauthentic they-self. It is in this evasion in the face of death, interpreted as a further way in which Dasein covers up Being, that everyday Dasein's fallen-ness now manifests itself. To be clear: evasion here does not necessarily mean that I refuse outright to acknowledge that I will someday die.
However, the certainty of death achieved by idle talk of this kind is of the wrong sort. One might think of it as established by the conclusion of some sort of inductive inference from observations of many cases of death the deaths of many others.
The certainty brought into view by such an inference is a sort of empirical certainty, one which conceals the apodictic character of the inevitability with which my own death is authentically revealed to me Being and Time In addition, as we have seen, according to Heidegger, my own death can never be actual for me, so viewed from my perspective, any case of death, i. Thus it must be a death that belongs to someone else, or rather, to no one.
Inauthenticity in relation to death is also realized in thrownness, through fear, and in projection, through expectation. Fear, as a mode of disposedness, can disclose only particular oncoming events in the world. To fear my own death, then, is once again to treat my death as a case of death. This contrasts with anxiety, the form of disposedness which, as we have seen, discloses my death via the awareness of the possibility of a world in which I am not. The projective analogue to the fear-anxiety distinction is expectation-anticipation.
A mundane example might help to illustrate the generic idea. When I expect a beer to taste a certain way, I am waiting for an actual event—a case of that distinctive taste in my mouth—to occur.
By contrast, when I anticipate the taste of that beer, one might say that, in a cognitive sense, I actively go out to meet the possibility of that taste. In so doing, I make it mine. Expecting death is thus to wait for a case of death, whereas to anticipate death is to own it. In reinterpreting care in terms of Being-towards-death, Heidegger illuminates in a new way the taking-as structure that, as we have seen, he takes to be the essence of human existence.
Human beings, as Dasein, are essentially finite. And it is this finitude that explains why the phenomenon of taking-as is an essential characteristic of our existence. An infinite Being would understand things directly, without the need for interpretative intercession. We, however, are Dasein, and in our essential finitude we must understand things in a hermeneutically mediated, indirect way, that is, by taking-as Sheehan What are we to make of Heidegger's analysis of death?
Sartre argues that death is the end of such possibilities. Thus: [The] perpetual appearance of chance at the heart of my projects cannot be apprehended as my possibility but, on the contrary, as the nihilation of all my possibilities.
A nihilation which itself is no longer a part of my possibilities. Thus death is not my possibility of no longer realizing a presence in the world but rather an always possible nihilation of my possibilities which is outside my possibilities.
Sartre , If Sartre is right, there is a significant hole in Heidegger's project, since we would be left without a way of completing the phenomenological analysis of Dasein. For further debate over Heidegger's handling of death, see Edwards' , , unsympathetic broadsides alongside Hinman's robust response. Heidegger stood that approach on its head.
For Heidegger, the very Being of the individual involves engagement with the world. Rather than facing up to their own finitude—represented above all by the inevitability of death —they seek distraction and escape in inauthentic modalities such as curiosity, ambiguity , and idle talk. Another distinguishing feature of Being and Time is its treatment of temporality Zeitlichkeit. Heidegger believed that traditional Western ontology from Plato to Immanuel Kant had adopted a static and inadequate understanding of what it means to be human.
From that standpoint one of the distinctive features of inauthentic Dasein is that it fails to actualize its Being. Its existential passivity becomes indistinguishable from the nonecstatic, inert being of things.
It imposes its technological-scientific-industrial character on human beings, making it the sole criterion of the human sojourn on earth. As it ultimately degenerates into ideologies and worldviews, metaphysics provides an answer to the question of the being of beings for contemporary men and women, but skillfully removes from their lives the problem of their own existence.
Moreover, because its sway over contemporary human beings is so powerful, metaphysics cannot be simply cast aside or rejected.
Any direct attempt to do so will only strengthen its hold. Metaphysics cannot be rejected, canceled or denied, but it can be overcome by demonstrating its nihilism. It refers to the forgetfulness of being.
What remains unquestioned and forgotten in metaphysics is Being; hence, it is nihilistic. According to Heidegger, Western humankind in all its relations with beings is sustained by metaphysics. Every age, every human epoch, no matter however different they may be— Greece after the Presocratics, Rome, the Middle Ages, modernity—has asserted a metaphysics and, therefore, is placed in a specific relationship to what-is as a whole. Metaphysics inquires about the being of beings, but it reduces being to a being; it does not think of being as being.
Insofar as being itself is obliterated in it, metaphysics is nihilism. The metaphysics of Plato is no less nihilistic than that of Nietzsche.
His attempt to overcome metaphysics is not based on a common-sense positing of a different set of values or the setting out of an alternative worldview, but rather is related to his concept of history, the central theme of which is the repetition of the possibilities for existence.
This repetition consists in thinking being back to the primordial beginning of the West—to the early Greek experience of being as presencing—and repeating this beginning, so that the Western world can begin anew.
From the First Beginning to the New Beginning Many scholars perceive something unique in the Greek beginning of philosophy. It is commonly acknowledged that Thales and his successors asked generalized questions concerning what is as a whole, and proposed general, rational answers which were no longer based on a theological ground. However, Heidegger does not associate the unique beginning with the alleged discovery of rationality and science. In fact, he claims that both rationality and science are later developments, so that they cannot apply to Presocratic thought.
They experience beings in their phenomenality: as what is present in presencing. But the later thought which begins with Plato and Aristotle is unable to keep up with the beginning. The aim which the later Heidegger sets before himself is precisely to return to the original experience of beings in being that stands at the beginning of Western thought. This unmediated experience of beings in their phenomenality can be variously described: what is present in presencing, the unconcealment of what is present, the original disclosure of beings.
To repeat the primordial beginning more originally in its originality means to bring us back to the Presocratic experiences, to dis-close them, and to let them be as they originally are. But the repetition is not for the sake of the Presocratics themselves. It happens as the listening that opens itself out to the words of the Presocratics from our contemporary age, from the age of the world picture and representation, the world which is marked by the domination of technology and the oblivion of being.
In the end, the task is to make questionable what at the end of a long tradition of philosophy-metaphysics has been forgotten. The new beginning begins thus with the question of being. Heidegger begins by asking about the multiple meanings of being and ends up conceding its multiplicity and acknowledging that there are multiple determinations or meanings of being in which being discloses itself in history. Nevertheless, in neither of these meanings does being give itself fully.
Therefore, the truth of being is none of its particular historical determinations—idea, substantia, actualitas, objectivity or the will to power. The truth of being can be defined as the openness, the free region which always out of sight provides the space of play for the different determinations of being and human epochs established in them. It is that which is before actual things and grants them a possibility of manifestation as what is present, ens creatum, and objects.
The truth of being, its openness, is for Heidegger not something which we can merely consider or think of. It is not our own production. It is where we always come to stand. We find ourselves thrown in a historically conditioned environment, in an epoch in which the decision concerning the prevailing interpretation of the being of being is already made for us.
Yet, by asking the question of being, we can at least attempt to free ourselves from our historical conditioning. It means turning oneself into being in its disclosing withdrawal. From Philosophy to Political Theory Heidegger never claimed that his philosophy was concerned with politics.
Nevertheless, there are certainly some political implications of his thought. He perceives the metaphysical culture of the West as a continuity. It begins with Plato and ends with modernity, and the dominance of science and technology. He turns to the Presocratics in order to retrieve a pre-metaphysical mode of thought that would serve as a starting point for a new beginning. However, his grand vision of the essential history of the West and of western nihilism can be questioned.
Modernity, whose development involves not only a technological but also a social revolution, which sets individuals loose from religious and ethnic communities, from parishes and family bonds, and which affirms materialistic values, can be regarded as a radical departure from earlier classical and Christian traditions.
Christianity challenges the classical world, while assimilating some aspects of it, and is in turn challenged by modernity. Modernity overturns the ideas and values of the traditional Christian and classical culture of the West, and, once it becomes global, leads to the erosion of nonwestern traditional cultures.
Under the cover of immense speculative depth and rich ontological vocabulary full of intricate wordplay both which make his writings extremely hard to follow Heidegger expresses a simple political vision. He wants to overturn the traditional culture of the West and build it anew on the basis of earlier traditions in the name of being. Like other thinkers of modernity, he adopts a Eurocentric perspective and sees the revival of German society as a condition for the revival of Europe or the West , and that of Europe as a condition for the revival of for the whole world; like them, while rejecting God as an end, he attempts to set up fabricated ends for human beings.
The greatness of what is to be thought is too great. He invokes the concept of the ancient polis. The Iliad and Odyssey of Homer, the poems of Hesiod, and the tragedies of Sophocles, as well as the other ancient Greek texts, including the monumental political work of Thucydides, the History of the Peloponnesian War, express concerns with ethical behavior at both the individual and community levels.
Furthermore, the strength of Western civilization, insofar as its roots can be traced to ancient Greece, is that from its beginning it was based on rationality, understood as free debate, and the affirmation of fundamental moral values. Whenever it turned to irrationality and moral relativism, as in Nazism and Communism, that civilization was in decline. Therefore, Heidegger is likely to be mistaken in his diagnosis of the ills of the contemporary society, and his solution to those ills seems to be wrong.
Asking the question of being and, drawing our attention to this question is certainly his significant contribution is an important addition to, but never a replacement for asking moral questions in the spirit of rationality and freedom. The human being is the unique being whose being has the character of openness toward Being. But men and women can also turn away from being, forget their true selves, and thus deprive themselves of their humanity. At the beginning of the tradition of Western philosophy, the human being was defined as animal rationale, the animal endowed with reason.
Since then, reason has become an absolute value which through education brings about a gradual transformation of all spheres of human life. It is not more reason in the modern sense of calculative thinking, Heidegger believes, that we need today, but more openness toward and more reflection on that which is nearest to us—being.
The Gesamtausgabe, which is not yet complete and projected to fill about one hundred volumes, is published by Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main.
In noting these features of moods we must be careful, however. Heidegger never simply adopts the metaphysical side against the empiricist or formalist doctrines but rather he consistently establishes what the basic problems of metaphysics are, acknowledging and demonstrating the persistent and repeated failure throughout its history to achieve its aims. The latter condition which is usually translated as inauthenticity, though not without controversy should be regarded as the normal condition for Dasein most of the time. Still, from the point of view of the quest for the meaning of being, Being and Time was a failure and remained unfinished. The best we can do is note that, by the end of the text, the transcendental has itself become historically embedded. They experience the being of beings as the presencing Anwesen of what is present Anwesende.
In so doing, I make it mine. To be clear: evasion here does not necessarily mean that I refuse outright to acknowledge that I will someday die. But, in a departure from the established Husserlian position, one that demonstrates the influence of Dilthey, Heidegger claims that phenomenology is not just transcendental, it is hermeneutic for discussion, see e. Here his philosophical interests are couched in language that ties the young Heidegger to a conservative anti-modernist tradition, which at that time favored the tough self assurance of the educated peasant classes against the fashionable bourgeoisie of modern urban life. Being, however, is not a ground.
Fear, as a mode of disposedness, can disclose only particular oncoming events in the world. In faculty members at Marburg proposed Heidegger as the replacement for Nicolai Hartmann in the philosophy chair, as a tenured full professor. Although he published very little in the early s, his mesmerizing podium presence created for him a legendary reputation among young students of philosophy in Germany. If we look around at beings in general—from particles to planets, ants to apes—it is human beings alone who are able to encounter the question of what it means to be e. His mother died less than three years later in at the age of 69, shortly after the publication of Sein und Zeit. Augustine's Confessions was particularly influential in shaping Heidegger's thought.
Its material nature is absorbed in its function. The final involvement here, the for-the-sake-of-which, is crucial, because according to Heidegger all totalities of involvements have a link of this type at their base. He lectured on Hegel in the summer semester, and on Plato in the winter semester. He completed his break with Catholicism by marrying a Lutheran , Elfride Petri, in The truth of being, its openness, is for Heidegger not something which we can merely consider or think of. Therefore, the truth of being is none of its particular historical determinations—idea, substantia, actualitas, objectivity or the will to power.